The success of the CD has (partly) been attributed to the ability of Sony, Philips and Matsushita to cooperate in the run-up to the DAD conference in 1981, where the technological standard was set. We model the situation leading up to the conference in a simple game with technological progress and the possibility of prelaunching a technology. We identify players' tradeo s between prelaunching (which ends technological progress) and continued development (which involves the risk of being pre-empted). Contrasting outcomes with complete and incomplete information, we nd that there appeared to be considerable uncertainty about rivals' technological progress.
Introduction
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of related industries including the computer and software industries, telecommunication and consumer electronics, compatibility standards have consistently been subject to academic attention (Besen and Saloner, 1989; Shapiro and Varian, 1999; Weitzel, 2004) . A large number of theoretical as well as empirical studies have studied standardization processes in detail.
1 Key issues in this research are the identi cation of circumstances under which standardization is (socially or privately) desirable, and the characterization of (however de ned) appropriate ways to achieve a standard. Clearly, there is a lot to learn from the study of past (successful or unsuccessful) standardization processes. In this paper, we focus on the introduction of the compact disc (CD) and explore how coalition formation, prelaunch strategies and technological progress may have a ected its success.
The introduction of the CD was a particularly successful standardization process in terms of its smoothness and speed. The process displayed a set of action typically attributed to two fundamentally di erent (and mutually exclusive) types of standardization processes; de facto standardization through market mechanisms, and formal standardization through explicit agreements in committees and industry consortia (Farrell and Saloner, 1988) . While in the former, a standard emerges from competition between different technical solutions in the marketplace, the latter refers to the de nition of a standard prior to its commercialization. An increasing number of standardization processes however cannot be placed squarely in either of the two categories. Recent theoretical as well as empirical contributions to the standardization literature have started studying such forms of "hybrid standardization" (see e.g. Farrell and Saloner, 1988; David and Monroe, 1994; Funk and Methe, 2001; Funk, 2002; Keil, 2002) and have identi ed several stylized facts related to hybrid standardization. In their seminal paper, Farrell and Saloner (1988) show that hybrid standardization processes may be superior to either of the pure mechanisms, market or committee. The main driver of this result is that the rms interested in setting a standard have two opportunities for coordination in each period: the market and the committee. Coordination is therefore achieved more frequently than with the market mechanism alone, and faster than by solely using the committee mechanism.
The Compact Disc standard appears to have been much smoother than some standards battles in similar technologies, 2 but also much quicker than many of the standardsetting committees { for instance, the average time for agreement on an IEEE standard is 7 years (Spring et al., 1995) . Other authors have focused on other features of the CD industry, such as the capacity investments by major players in introducing the tech-nology in the US market (McGahan, 1993) , the existence of indirect network e ects (Gandal et al., 2000) and the comparison with similar, but unsuccessful, technologies (Rohlfs, 2001 ). Our paper focuses on the CD standardization process in particular. Building a simple model of standard-setting with technological progress, we nd that it may have been precisely the mixture of market elements (in the form of a product prelaunch) and committee elements (in the form of the industry's approval conference) that contributed to the success of the outcome. We are especially interested in studying the various motives for a prelaunch. In particular, it is interesting to see if the prelaunch in this particular case predominantly revealed the prelaunching rms' type or if there are some extraneous bene ts to a prelaunch (for instance, through enlarging the action space { making concession possible { and, thereby, creating the possibility of an increase in the total size of the prize to be gained).
3
In our analysis, we focus on the time period prior to the widespread agreement on the Philips/Sony solution, i.e. the standard's development process which was completed by its approval at the Digital Audio Disc (DAD) conference in Japan in April 1981. We choose this event even though the approval forum at the conference actually approved of two di erent solutions (the Philips/Sony technology, and also the technology proposed by JVC) and despite the fact this approval represented just the prelude for the actual establishment in the market place (which followed rather quickly). However, evidence from the case as well as an analysis of the agents' incentives suggest that in fact just one viable technology (the Philips/Sony standard which survives to this day) emerged from the conference. Neither of the unapproved technologies nor JVC's approved technology ever got to the market.
The paper is structured as follows. We summarize the main facts of the CD case in Section 2. 4 We then introduce the basic model in Section 3 and relate the results of our model to the CD case in Section 4. We conclude in Section 5.
Introducing the Compact Disc
The invention of the phonograph by Thomas Edison in 1877 marked the rst audio recording technology. It was only in the 1940's however when the long-playing record (LP) as well as the magnetic tape were created and enabled widespread use of audio technology by nal consumers. By the late 1970's, analog technologies had reached their limits: among other problems, analog recordings had a very limited dynamic range 5 and 3 In this sense, our paper is related to a recent paper by Hoerner and Sahuguet (2004) which extends a classic war of attrition to allow for a wider action space beyond the binary choice between "wait" and "concede". 4 For a more detailed account of the case see e.g. Gamharter 2004 ). 5 The dynamic ranges indicates the range of frequencies that a sound medium covers. A larger dynamic range implies that hardly (but still) audible signals are reproduced, resulting in better sound su ered from quality losses associated with the master recording process and wear and tear during use. Increasing recognition of these inherent limitations triggered the dawn of a new audio playback standard for the mass consumer market: the Compact Disc Digital Audio System, or CD. 6 
A new technology
Enhanced audio technology sparked worldwide developer interest: Nearly all major (and some minor) consumer electronics manufacturers became increasingly committed to research and development in search of a new audio playback technology in the late 1960s and 1970s. Among the main players were Philips N.V. from the Netherlands, Sony Corporation (Japan), The Victor Company of Japan Ltd. (JVC) and its parent rm Matsushita, as well as Telefunken/Decca (German Teledec). RCA (USA) and Thompson (France) were also working on enhanced video systems and were hence at least at the periphery involved in the development of an enhanced audio format. In 1977, several rms (Mitsubishi, Sony and Hitachi) presented early versions of digital audio discs and players at the Tokyo Audio Fair. Di erent technological trajectories were pursued: Telefunken, for instance, worked on a mechanical system ("Mini Disc") with information engraved in grooves similar to phonograph records. JVC's system ("Audio High Density") was based on magnetic scanning. Philips developed an optical disc system based on an early prototype of the VideoDisc 7 using a digital code instead of putting an analog picture onto the disc. Philips then announced its rst digital Compact Disc Audio System, a 110mm optical disc, in May 1978. Sony as well was experimenting with an optical system to record digital audio.
Despite all these diverse and initially dispersed e orts, there was a strong belief from the outset that, in view of the large installed base of the LP and magnetic tape technologies, joint e orts would be required in order to assert any new audio playback format. In particular, getting the new technology adopted in the popular segment was a major source of concern (McGahan, 1993) { a belief that may retrospectively appear surprising given the success of `the CD and evidence suggesting that CD technology actually possessed several features that made it particularly attractive to nal users in the popular segment (e.g. remote control, possibilities of programming sequences of titles, no need to reverse/repeat options, and the possibility of using the same software for home use and en-route). Winning over this segment which was much larger compared quality. 6 In fact, digital audio had rst been developed by Thomas Stockman at MIT in the early 1960's. Through his company, Soundstream Inc., he also pioneered the commercialization of digital sound recording. The technology's target in these early days however was clearly professional use, for instance by large broadcasting and production houses. 7 The VideoDisc, based on digital signals, was introduced by Philips in the 1970s and failed dismally. Only 1000 players were ever sold.
to the other basic group, the classical segment was, however, considered crucial for the establishment of a new industry standard. In addition, the experience from recent standards battles was still fresh for some of the involved rms. In the well-documented video wars, Sony had just lost out with its Betamax technology to JVC's VHS system. Philips, on the other hand, had been successful in setting the de facto industry standard for the compact cassette in 1963 against the German consumer electronics manufacturer Grundig { by means of a strategic alliance with Sony. In view of these experiences, as well as concerns regarding the adoption by software producers and nal consumers and in recognition of the complementarity of their particular elds of strength in this development process, two of the main players nally teamed up in 1979: Philips and Sony signed an agreement to jointly develop a technical standard for digital audio playback.
Introducing a new technology
There are three stages at which standardization decisions can be taken. The development stage of a new technology, the approval, or committee phase, and the commercialization phase. Agreeing on a standard in each (or more) of the stages has its own advantages and disadvantages. Standardization in the rst stage is equivalent to foregoing development of competing, incompatible technologies, which carries a technological opportunity cost (since it is not clear that the chosen technology is the e cient one). On the other hand, rms avoid duplicating development cost, and rms might bene t from knowledge sharing (Cabral, 2000) . Standardization through committees has been studied in detail by Farrell and Saloner (1988) . Their general intuition is that nding a common solution might be time-consuming, but will likely lead to a more e cient solution than marketbased standardization. Finally, standard battles (i.e. de facto standardization on the market) may still generate ine cient outcomes and is likely to be very costly for sponsors of a particular standard. The following sections outline the events in these three stages in the particular case of the CD launch. Our emphasis however will be on the rst two stages, since we are especially interested in the way standardization took place. A detailed presentation and analysis of the commercialization of the CD is McGahan (1993).
The development phase
Philips and Sony teamed up in the rst phase to form a technology development alliance. Philips' initial approach had been based on the (analog) VideoDisc. As the human ear is more sensitive to quality aws than the human eye however, this approach kept delivering unsatisfactory results. As a result, Philips turned towards digital recording. In 1974, Philips started working towards recording music digitally and reading the data by an optical signal, thereby avoiding wear and tear. Yet, digital code turned out to be much more error-sensitive than analog data, resulting in undesirable playback errors.
Despite its expertise in the optical domain and with the precision mechanics of the system, Philips recognized that it lacked expertise in the coding of digital information and error correction systems. Hence, for technological as well as strategic reasons, a strategic alliance seemed attractive. From these considerations, Sony emerged as the strategic partner in the technological development process. Philips and Sony, although competitors in many areas, shared a long history of cooperation, for instance in the joint establishment of the compact cassette standard in the 1960's. In their initial forays into digital audio, Sony speci cally focused on the development of signal error correction technology, that is, an error protection code that allows for detection, correction or concealment of (inevitable) recording errors { precisely the area which Philips was lacking expertise in. Also on both rms' minds was that by teaming up they each eliminated a formidable competitor (McGahan, 1993; Besen and Farrell, 1994) .
Meetings in 1978 at which Philips at least partly revealed its audio digital disc technology set the stage for an agreement that was signed in October 1979 at which both rms agreed to jointly develop a digital audio playback technology and attempt to establish it as a standard. In marketing the nal products however both rms would compete against each other again. Philips brought its expertise in opto-electronics and some basic patents from its LaserDisc development to the alliance, while Sony contributed its advanced error correction system. In addition, both rms had a presence in the music industry via CBS/Sony, a joint venture between CBS Inc. and Sony Japan Records Inc. dating from the late 1960s, and Polygram, a 50% subsidiary of Philips. Both music companies were basically engaged on all relevant stages of music production from planning to recording, promotion and sales. Winning the music industry's support for the new technology was essential: without su cient music available in the new format, there would be no chance for widespread adoption by nal consumers with sizeable LP and tape libraries. In 1983, 915 in 1000 UK households owned record and/or tape playback equipment (BPI Yearbook 1992). Strong indirect network e ects and (sunk) investments in incompatible software libraries implied the presence of signi cant switching costs.
After the agreement had been signed, research teams of Philips and Sony entered into negotiations over the technological properties of the jointly developed disc. In the development process, they faced a trade-o . On the one hand, extensive development times meant maximizing the quality of the technology and thereby maximizing chances of approval at the upcoming DAD conference and gaining the support of other consumer electronics manufacturers. On the other hand, bringing the technology on the market quickly seemed attractive due to the danger of preemption by other manufacturers developing competing systems. In June 1980, the exact speci cations werde determined. They were documented in the System Description Compact Disc Digital Audio, the so-called Redbook, to ensure that all software produced for this technology (the Compact Disc Digital Audio technology) could be played on all pieces of hardware (the corresponding players). The Redbook addressed not only static compatibility, but also ensured (backward) compatibility of future hard-and software manufactured within the standard. The publication of the Redbook a year before the DAD conference e ectively prelaunched the technology { its fundamental properties became xed and common knowledge. To some extent, it even went beyond an ordinary product prelaunch since, although neither of the developers had presented a workable product by that time, they soon started licensing the technology to industry players at relatively low rates. As a result, by late 1981 Philips/Sony had already granted licenses for the development of CD-compatible products to 30 audio equipment manufacturers and 8 record replicators. The licensing strategy adopted was in uenced by two main objectives: broadening the support base for the technology (by o ering favourable licensing terms), and protecting compatibility (by insisting on compliance with the Redbook). The launch of the Redbook was followed by announcements by both Philips and Sony to present individual prototypes at the 29th Japan Audio Fair in October 1981. 
The approval phase
Approval of the new audion standard took place at the DAD Conference in Japan in April 1981. Organized by the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) with the explicit aim of de ning a digital audio standard, it had been put in place already in 1978 and was attended by 29 consumer electronics manufacturers. The aim was to lay the ground for establishing a new audio standard: based on the approval, rst the support of the relevant software producers, mainly the music industry and record manufacturers, had to be gained. Later, with hardware and a certain amount of software available, nal consumers would be targeted. The DAD conference eventually approved two technologies: Philips/Sony and JVC. Telefunken's proposal for a mechanical system was not approved. Despite the DAD's approval however, JVC's technology never made it to the market. While the conference had been scheduled in 1978 already and took place in April 1981, it was e ectively preempted by the events between June 1980 (submission and publication of the Redbook) and January 1981 when Matsushita, the parent company of JVC, announced its intention to support the Philips/Sony technology. This latter date in particular marked the real turning point since from then onwards, the CD was supported by the three largest consumer electronic rms (Dai, 1996) .
The fact that only one technology was commercialized subsequent to the DAD conference certainly smoothened the standard-setting process in hindsight. By no means however was it already clear at that point, that the technology that had managed to throw several other new technologies out of the race would also be a success when racing against the LP and the compact cassette.
The commercialization phase
The licensing policy adopted by Philips/Sony was probably in uenced both by Philips' successful licensing of the compact cassette standard and Sony's negative experience in the VCR standards battle where they, as sponsors of Betamax, lost out against a heavily licensed technology (VHS) with its corresponding advantages in terms of critical mass and lower prices. Although winning the support of other hardware manufacturers seemed relatively simple, initial acceptance by software producers, i.e. the music industry (software content) and record manufacturers (physical elements of software) was sluggish. Partly, this stemmed from the new technology's lack of a built-in copy protection device, partly from the fact that the industry had just recently invested heavily in expanding and improving production facilities for the old technology, and partly from the requirement to pay royalties (however low) to Philips/Sony for both hard-and software production { after all, licenses for the compact cassette standard a few years prior had been granted freely by Philips. Finally, rms in the music and recording industry were skeptical about adoption among nal consumers in the mass market because of the high initial price and recent experiences of failed consumer electronics technologies.
9 Therefore, any initial momentum in the software area had to come from software producers that had some link to the standard sponsors.
10 On October 1, 1982, Sony launched the rst commercially available CD player, the CDP-101. Philips followed a month later with the CD player "Pinkeltje". The initial product launch in Japan and Europe was followed by the US launch in early 1983. The set of the rst 50 CDs included classical as well as popular and rock releases. Both Philips and Sony ran extensive marketing campaigns aimed at increasing awareness among nal consumers, getting them to experience the technology and shaping expectations, i.e. establishing the CD as the technology of the future in consumers' minds. Despite being competitors in the market place, there was a strong impetus to promote not only their own products but also the generic technology in order to establish it as the new industry standard. In spite of the initial scarcity in software, adoption by nal consumers was fast and widespread. Increased sound quality, but also ease of use and many convenient functional features won over the popular segment in particular much faster than expected by many industry participants and observers (McGahan, 1993) . Prior to its introduction in 1982, Philips/Sony had been hoping that somewhat more than 10m CDs would be sold worldwide in 1985. Within a year, they revised their forecasts to 15m CDs. Actual sales of CDs in 1985 were 59m.
Viewed historically, the introduction of the CD seems straightforward. Philips has 9 The failure of quadraphonic sound was only a few years back and fresh in producers' minds (Postrel, 1990) , as was the VideoDisc unsuccessfully introduced by Philips.
10 Not surprisingly, 97 out of the 107 CD titles available in 1983 were supplied by CBS/Sony and Polydor K.K. (an a liate of Polygram GmbH, W. Germany). The scarcity of software was short-lived however: by 1985, approximately 1750 classical titles and 3250 pop titles were available on CD (see BPI Yearbooks 1986 and 1987 for more detailed data).
even been likened to "a virtuoso who makes a very di cult piece seem easy" (Rohlfs, 2001 , p. 91). Nevertheless, players faced signi cant uncertainty about strategies and their likely outcomes. Aware that replacing an ubiquitous industry standard involved high risk, but high potential rewards, all industry participants took actions that may seem rational once the complete picture is known, but had to be taken with a degree of uncertainty both about future payo s and likely actions by their rivals. For example, why did Philips/Sony publish the Redbook quite some time before the DAD conference, risking premature commitment to a potentially ine cient technology? Similarly, why did JVC/Matsushita announce its intentions to support Sony/Philips' standard months before the DAD conference? After all, by continuing development of their own technology they might have been successful in asserting theirs as a standard.
11 . We will address these and related questions in the following simple model.
The Model
We start with a general formulation of our model. Two risk neutral players i; j compete for the highest share of a divisible (common-value) prize. The overall size of the prize depends on three factors: market size X, product quality of the (weakly) superior technology q = max (q i ; q j ), and cooperation or concession bene ts . The total size of the prize is ( ; q; X).
Suppose that there are two stages, a development and a bargaining stage:
1. Development stage. In the rst stage, both technologies improve exogenously over time, i.e., @q i @t > 0. We use a continuous time setting. Development ends at t = T , so that q i;max = q i;T . A better technology will have a higher chance of being accepted in the marketplace, i.e. post-introduction. 12 This gives players an incentive to wait until T to introduce their technology. On the other hand, committing to one's own technology rst (i.e. before the other player does) may confer pre-introduction advantages, which gives players an incentive to preempt each other. When rms cooperate, payo s increase increase by a factor 1. The longer the players cooperate in the run-up to the bargaining stage, the higher the bene t, i.e. @ @t 0. We ignore discounting. 11 The fact that both Philips/Sony's and JVC's technology were approved suggests that the quality of JVC's technology exceeded a certain absolute quality threshold, which rules out the most convenient answer to JVC's dilemma, namely that their technology was simply a "dead duck" without any potential for commercialization. 12 We model this as market pro ts being an increasing function of product quality. This is of course identical to modelling the probability of acceptance as an increasing function of product quality.
13 This is a sensible assumption since up to T , the players compete for claims to the nal prize rather than the nal prize itself. Claims that are acquired earlier are no more valuable to the players than those acquired closer to the deadline T .
2. Bargaining stage. After T both players start bargaining over the distribution of pro ts. We assume that the bargaining strengths are a ected by their respective qualities, i.e.
The players' strategy space is determined by the previous history of the game: If no action has been taken, a player can choose to stay in (S) and continue developing the own technology or prelaunch (P ) her own technology. If a prelaunch has taken place, a player can concede (C) or stay in (S). Each player can move (i.e. play P or C) only once. S is straightforward in its implications: The technology in question improves over time, and there are no changes in payo s otherwise. The other strategies are described in more detail below.
Prelaunch. Prelaunching one's technology ends technological progress. Essentially, by prelaunching the player commits to implementing a technology conforming to the speci cations set out in the prelaunch. Prelaunching is possible at any time between 0 and T . We normalize the time horizon of the development game to 1, i.e. T = 1.
Concede.
Conceding is only possible after a prelaunch has taken place.
14 C implies that the player stops development on the own technology and starts supporting the rival standard. This implies being awarded the smaller share of the prize (1 ), but it gives rise to concession bene ts . In other words, a player conceding will obtain a smaller share of a larger pie. The assumption that concession bene ts decrease over time implies that, if concession takes place at all, it will take place immediately following a prelaunch. 15 If no concession takes place throughout the game, = 1.
Payo s
Suppose now that a prelaunch by rm i was successful, i.e. rm j conceded immediately thereafter. Firm i's payo s are i = i (t i ; q i ; ; ; X). The remainder, (1 ), will be rm j's payo .
We use speci c functional forms for the elements of our payo function. Where our assumptions are restrictive in a sense that alternative speci cations generate di erent outcomes, we will discuss this in Section 4.
Overall market size (X). For simplicity, we normalize X = 1.
Winner's share ( ). We assume that the winner is whoever has the better technology at T or whose technology has been accepted as the industry standard. The winner's share is assumed to be > 1 2 , the loser's (1 ), and independent of the time of standardization or the di erence in qualities. If both technologies are of equal quality, both players share the market.
Technological quality (q i;t ). We assume that there are two di erent speeds of development (slow and f ast) and that technologies develop linearly. This means that we can write
Concession bene ts ( (t) = t ). Concession bene ts are assumed to be decreasing linearly over time, and assumed to exceed the payo s from not conceding (1) at the end of the development stage. The assumption of decreasing bene ts over time seems realistic: prior to the bargaining stage at T , the earlier both rms join forces, the less R&D costs are duplicated, the more time the coalition has to exert in uence on third parties in favour of their technology, the more time third parties have to adapt their products to the technology, etc.. The assumption that concession still conveys bene ts at T can also be justi ed on the grounds that prior to bargaining for a standard, a pre-negotiation agreement will still save the time and e ort of negotiating. The simplest speci cation of this scenario of concession bene ts is t = M t, M > 2.
Market pro ts ( ). Finally, we assume that our market pro t function is multiplicative, i.e. = q X.
Equilibrium

Bargaining stage
If no agreement on either one of the technological solutions has been achieved until T , the players bargain over the distribution of pro ts during a single round (the approval conference). The general structure of our bargaining stage is very simple and basically a version of "Splitting the pie" (e.g. Rasmusen, 2001): Two players choose shares ! i ; ! j of the total prize. We assume that the bargaining strengths are a ected by their respective qualities, i.e.
At the start of the bargaining stage (i.e. the approval conference) at the latest, the qualities of the players' technologies are made publicly known, i.e. become common knowledge. We distinguish between two cases:
1. Both players' technologies have the same quality at T (q i = q j ) and, hence, equal bargaining strength. Both players choose simultaneously. If ! i + ! j = 1, each player obtains its chosen share. If ! i + ! j > 1, both players get zero (failure to achieve agreement, which leads, e.g. to a standards battle in the market place).
The game has a continuum of Nash equilibria with any strategy combination (! i ; ! j ) such that ! i + ! j = 1 representing a Nash equilibrium. However, there is one strategy combination which represents a focal point and unique symmetric pure strategy equilibrium (in a continuous strategy space), (
).
2. Players' technologies di er in their quality at T (q i 6 = q j ) and, therefore, also in their bargaining strengths. Players move sequentially. Superior technology gives a player (e.g. player i if q i > q j ) with the ability to move rst. We assume (exogenously given for now) to represent the maximum share a player can ask for. 16 Again, if ! i +! j = 1, each player obtains its chosen share. If ! i +! j > 1, both players get zero. The unique Nash equilibrium is ( ; 1 ) where ! i = ; ! j = 1 .
Development stage
We solve the game by backward induction. For the second mover, we derive a concession condition (CC) which gives parameter constellations for , , q i and t i for which the follower, after a prelaunch, will want to concede or stay in until the end. The (prospective) rst mover then takes this into account in the decision whether and when to prelaunch. That is, we look for the prelaunch condition (PC) for the prospective rst mover.
Stackelberg Leadership
We rst analyze the case in which rm i is a Stackelberg leader and can initiate a prelaunch. Firm j can only decide whether to concede or stay in if a prelaunch has taken place. If both players are of the same type (i.e. d i = d j ), we obtain the following proposition (which follows from the algebra below): Proposition 1 With Stackelberg leadership and symmetric types, the leader will only prelaunch if the follower concedes. If not, both players will stay in until time T . If a prelaunch takes place, it will be at the e cient time.
The intuition of this result is quite simple. If both the leader and the follower would bene t from agreeing on a standard prior to introduction, they will do so at the most e cient time. In this case, the follower concedes because it is privately optimal to do so, and the leader will maximize its payo s by maximizing its share of the prize, , 16 An alternative way of modeling would be to have bargaining strengths determined by the players' respective qualities. . This would allow for more parsimonious modeling. We therefore plan to extend our analysis to include this modi cation but do not expect qualitative changes to our current results. which amounts to maximizing overall payo s . On the other hand, the follower would only refuse to concede if it ends up winning, i.e. if q i;t < q j;T , in which case the leader is better o ensuring a share 1 2 of pro ts rather than (1 ) . The concession condition is determined by the relative strength of concession bene ts and winner's share . If concession bene ts are relatively small and the winner's share is large, the follower is less likely to concede.
We derive the concession and prelaunch conditions below. Player j concedes if
The concession payo is simply the smaller share of total payo s from a technology prelaunched and agreed on at t i . The payo from staying in until T is the winner's share of a technology that has been developed until T . The concession condition is therefore
This upper bound for the winner's share is increasing in t i and M , which is intuitive { if the follower's technology has less time left to leapfrog the leader's, or if the bene ts from concession are high, the follower will be content with a lower share of overall pro ts. Note also that for all M 2 the Stackelberg leader chould choose an endogeneous 1 2 to ensure that the follower concedes. We can express CC also in terms of the earliest time t i at which a prelaunch would trigger concession (t min C ):
Turning to the prelaunch condition, we require i (P ) i (S), or
Note that a prelaunch would never be chosen if > C . 18 In this case, staying in would be the equilibrium strategy for the Stackelberg 17 For M > 2, the alternative solution t
4 + (1 ) never yields a time t i within the permissible range of values. As a result, if there is valid solution at all, it is always given by our expression of CC. 18 To complete the proof, we need to show that in equilibrium, the Stackelberg leader never chooses an unsuccessful prelaunch P U , i.e. never chooses prelaunch if it does not trigger concession by the follower. Suppose the Stackelberg leader i would choose P U in equilibrium. This requires i (P U ) i (S), or q j;T (1 ) In that case, i is indi erent between S and P . Note that, i is indi erent between all prelaunch times t i because they all leader. We rewrite the preliminary prelaunch condition P C 1 as follows:
This is decreasing in t i : The later in the game, the smaller the winner's share can be to support a pro table prelaunch. The intuition is that a prelaunch at later stages implies less foregone tchnological progress, i.e. less foregone increase in the total size of the prize until T . Since this foregone improvement needs to be (over-) compensated by a higher share ( compared to 1 2 ), at later stages smaller will make a prelaunch pro table. We can express P C 1 as well in terms of the prelaunch time and nd the earliest time t i that satis es the P C 1 (t min P ) from:
1 2 Combining the P C 1 and CC conditions, we obtain the following illustrative graph (for M = 3):
Of the two conditions, CC is the binding constraint. That is, for each time that CC holds, P C 1 holds as well, but not vice versa. Hence, the binding prelaunch condition P C 2 in this case equals CC. Now given that these two conditions are satis ed, when is the e cient prelaunch time t i ? With the speci c functional forms we use, t i is at T , since there will still be bene ts from prelaunching, but technological progress will have been maximized. If player i is the Stackelberg leader, i maximizes max i (P ),i.e.
It is easy to see that this yields the optimal prelaunch time t i = T for all development speeds (as long as P C 2 holds at all during the interval [0; T ]).
yield the same payo . What about the follower j? The above reasoning requires j (for = 1 2 ) to have j (S) j (C) i.e. q j;T 2 qi;t P 2 or, for our speci c functional forms,
, there exists at least one time b t i (= 1) for which this does not hold, i.e. if player i was to prelaunch at b t i , j would concede because C and S get j the same share of the prize (because of = 1 2 ), but concession bene ts still accrue. This in turn a ects player i: i can obtain a higher payo than i (P U ) = q T j 2 by undertaking a prelaunch at b t i instead of earlier times. Hence, player i prefers prelaunching at b t i to an (unsuccessful) earlier prelaunch. Consequently, the Stackelberg will never choose an unsuccessful prelaunch in equilibrium. 19 For M > 2, the alternative solution t
2 never yields a time t i within the feasible range of values. As a result, if there is valid solution at all, it is always given by our expression of P C 1 .
Figure 1: Prelaunch and concession conditions
If the Stackelberg leader prelaunches, the prelaunch will take place at t i = 1 and j concedes at the same time. 20 Note that for M = 3 and = 3 5 , the earliest time when both PC 1 and CC are met is t min P;C :63, but the existence of Stackelberg leadership ensures that the prelaunch takes place at the pro t-maximizing time. In other words, the absence of any threat of preemption ensures the e cient outcome if such an outcome can be achieved in the rst place.
So far, our assumption was that both players are symmetric in their technological capabilities. We now analyze the impact of technological asymmetry on the outcome of our game with a Stackelberg leader. Suppose rst that the leader has the more e cient technology, i.e. d i = f , d j = s. We rst consider the prelaunch condition PC 1 . For q i > q j , the prelaunch condition is independent of : M > t + will concede. We then derive the following concession condition CC for q j;T > q i;t i :
which is less binding than in the symmetric case (for q j;T < q i;t i , player j always concedes). 21 With our speci cation of (t) = M t, we obtain a more clear cut result. The optimal prelaunch time t i coincides with the latest possible time for a prelaunch, i.e. t i = T . As a result, in equilibrium player i always undertakes a prelaunch at t i = T and player j always concedes, i.e. q j;T < q i;t i . Suppose now that the leader i has the less e cient technology, i.e. d i = s, d j = f . The concession condition CC becomes:
which is more stringent than in the symmetric case since d j > d i { it takes a higher share of the payo s to make the follower sacri ce her own (superior) standard. Turning to the prelaunch condition P C 1 , we nd that for
Depending on the value of t i t i , this condition may either be stricter or less strict than with symmetric types Stackelberg leadership. For = (M t), we know that t i = T = 1. This allows us to derive a well-de ned relationship: For d i = s, d j = f , 00 P > P , which implies that a higher winner's share is required to make a prelaunch pro table for the less e cient Stackelberg leader. As the rival technology is superior, this makes sense: By (succesfully) prelaunching, the leader increases its share of the pie (from (1 ) to 0 P ). But the size of the prize is a ected by two e ects working in opposite directions:
The prelaunch allows for some increase of the prize through concession bene ts, but also leads to some shrinkage in its size due to the choice of the less e cient technology. This latter e ect is not present with symmetric types and Stackelberg leadership. So the greater winner's share required to induce a prelaunch serves as a kind of "built-in" protection mechanism against the ine ciency associated with pre-assigned roles and a less e cient leading rm.We summarize our results on technological asymmetry with Stackelberg leadership in Proposition 2:
21 In case q j;T = q i;ti : we would obtain 0 C = 1 2 dj diti t i + 1, which is also less strict. However, with continuous types there would be zero probability of this case. Hence, in the following we concentrate on the case of q j;T > q i;ti .
Proposition 2 If the Stackelberg leader is the e cient rm, a prelaunch will take place for smaller values of the loser's share. Conversely, for the speci cation of concession bene ts we use, a prelaunch is feasible only for a smaller range of values of the winner's share if the leading rm is less e cient, and the outcome is ine cient since either the inferior technology is chosen or concession bene ts are not realized. If the leading rm is less e cient, there is a limit to the relative superiority of the follower's technology for prelaunch and concession to take place. P roof. See appendix. The presence of pre-assigned roles (Stackelberg leadership) may create an ineciency by not allowing the technologically stronger party to move rst and undertake a prelaunch. This scenario di ers from the symmetric case and the case where the more e cient party is the Stackelberg leader where Stackelberg leadership serves as a benchmark because the equilibrium result is more e cient than without pre-assigned roles (as will be shown in the following section). Such a scenario may seem counterintuitive at rst { why would a less e cient rm be a Stackelberg leader? Given that rms will develop many products in their existence however, this seems like a genuine possibility. Stackelberg leadership may be determined from a broader context. Consider for example a case where product (pre-)announcements are only credible by one player, but the quality (i.e. development speed) of a particular technology may be high or low, so that a Stackelberg leader may be developing the inferior technology.
Strategic Symmetry
As mentioned, Stackelberg leadership generates the e cient outcome unless the Stackelberg leader has an inferior technology. We will now analyze the incentive by rms to preempt each other by prelaunching their technology in a scenario of strategic symmetry, so that both rms can end up the leader but no roles are pre-assigned a priori. Again, we start with the symmetric case for illustrative purposes and then analyze the changes to the results if players are not (type-)symmetric.
Without pre-assigned roles, the players each have an incentive to preempt each other by undertaking a prelaunch. At the same time, they have an incentive to wait as long as possible before undertaking a prelaunch (see above). The incentive to preempt prevails as long as the payo of the player that gets to succesfully prelaunch ( (L P S )) is greater than the payo of the player that ends up following ( (
, i.e. the concession condition holds, meaning that a prelaunch would be successful. If the parameter constellation of M , is such that the concession condition is ful lled from some time t min onwards, 22 both players have an incentive to prelaunch at t min to avoid being preempted. On the other hand, if (L P S ) < (F ) for all t i , no 22 The LHS is increasing in t i , while the RHS is time-invariant, so that if (L P S ) > (F ) holds for t min , it holds for all t i > t min .
player will want to prelaunch. With strategic and type symmetry, we therefore obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 3 If a prelaunch can be successful at any time during the interval, with strategic and type symmetry there will be a unique mixed-strategy equilibrium in prelaunch times and identities. With probability 1 2 , player i prelaunches at the earliest pro table prelaunch time t min and player j concedes immediately. The roles are reversed with probability 1 2 . P roof. See appendix. This setting is comparable to Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) , and in particular their "Case A". Here, the leader's maximum payo is strictly greater than the payo from simultaneous adoption (reinterpreted as the payo from both staying in). With contiuous time, we rely on the assumption that a "mistake" in the sense of simultaneous prelaunch is impossible and that therefore the question to be resolved is the identity of the leader, but not the prelaunch time.
As a result, prelaunch and concession take place much earlier than in the Stackelberg case (if they take place at all). Strategic symmetry creates incentives to preempt, which results in an ine ciency, since the prelaunch takes place at t min rather than t . To some extent, this result is the "rent equalization" result in Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) .
How does this result change if the players are di erent types? Being a stronger type involves a tradeo . On one hand, prelaunching is feasible at an earlier time. On the other hand, however, the opportunity cost from prelaunching are higher since the remaining development time would be more pro table. Assuming that a prelaunch is pro table to begin with, however, we can determine the identity of the prelaunching rm:
Proposition 4 If the less e cient player's CC is ever satis ed, the more e cient player always undertakes a prelaunch. The timining of this prelaunch depends on whether her own CC is ever satis ed during the interval. If that is not the case, that is, the stronger player's CC is never satis ed, the prelaunch will take place at the optimal time t . If the stronger player's CC is satis ed during the interval, she will preluanch just before her own CC is satis ed, that is, just before the weaker player would prelaunch. The prelaunch time is strictly earlier in this case. An ine ciency due to foregone technological progress arises.
P roof. See appendix.
A number of interesting results emerge in comparison to the other cases. First, the identity of the prelaunching party is determined endogenously { a stronger rm prelaunches rst. Second, compared to the respective Stackelberg leader case, an ineciency arises from the danger that the less e cient rm might undertake a prelaunch as well. This however will only restrict the leader's behaviour if the di erence in types is not too large. This implies that a case arises where competition between unequal rivals may be more e cient than between equal rivals.
Incomplete Information
Consider now the case where development speeds (i.e. types) are private information and drawn independently from a continuous uniform distribution on the interval d i;j 2 [0; 1]. A prelaunch will reveal a player's type. If no player undertakes a prelaunch until the end of the game (T), both players' types are revealed at T and payo s are allocated as described above. With incomplete information, players do not know if they are the more or less e cient type. Nevertheless, in e ect one player will end up being the follower (player j) and the other one being the leader (player i), unless both players stay in until T .
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Suppose that rms have to (privately) commit themselves to a prelaunch time at the start of the game. This seems reasonable given the considerable lead times required for prelaunching a complex product and the milestones-based project planning approach usually adopted for complex, long-term projects. We start by analyzing the follower's (j) considerations. Given that the leader (i) has undertaken a prelaunch and thereby revealed its type, player j decides, based on its private knowledge of its own type, whether to stay in or concede. We derive the concession condition as a function of the (revealed) leader's type d i below. Player j concedes if j (C) j (S), 24 i.e.
We solve for a lower limit d j for j's development speed d j such that for d j > d j , player j decides to stay in after the prelaunch. 25 We obtain the following concession condition:
Turning to i's prelaunch condition, player i considers for each time t i 2 [0; T ] whether to undertake a prelaunch at the respective time or not. This is based on the expected payo from a prelaunch at t i , b i (P ) where P S re ects the payo from a successful prelaunch (i.e. followed by j's concession), P U the payo from an unsuccessful prelaunch, 23 With a continuous, uniform distribution over types d, there is zero probability of d i = d j , and, hence, of a simultaneous prelaunch.
24 S is strictly dominated by C in case j was not able to overtake or at least catch up with i's technology (as revealed in the prelaunch) by T , i.e. q j;T < q i;ti . 25 The inequality needs to be strict because of assumed weak preference for concession.
andbmarks expected values. 26 That is
! With a uniform distribution of types and conservative expectation formation (i.e. no additional exogenously given information on types and no Bayesian updating), we have:
We directly derive P C 2 for a set of times from
De ning d i (1 ) = z i , using our speci cation of (t) = M t, and de ning (t i t i ) = v t i , we obtain
We use a numerical example for illustration: We set = 0:7, d i = 0:8, and M = 3. The lower bound d j as a function of the prelaunch time t i is then d j (t i ) = Figure 2 below). The lower bound is increasing with prelaunch time, which indicates that late prelaunches will be more likely (ceteris paribus) to be successful. The rival's technology simply has less time to catch up, or, to put it di erently, the technological progress sacri ced by the prelaunching rm is smaller.
Turning now to the prelaunch condition P C 2 , we nd that given our parameter values, the rst t i 2 [0; 1] that satis es P C 2 is (approx.) t min P;C = 0:59. In the following 26 With a continuous, uniform distribution over types d, there is zero probability of d i = d j , and, hence, of a simultaneous prelaunch. 27 As long as the other player has not undertaken a prelaunch before, C is not an available action and, hence, not relevant for the comparison. In case, however, the other player has already undertaken a prelaunch, the above reasoning for the follower applies. 
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This results in the following proposition:
Proposition 5 With incomplete information, adoption times are earlier than the efcient outcome. Also, second ine cieny arises because players undertake prelaunches that turn out to be unsuccessful. 
The CD launch revisited
The success of the CD can be attributed to any number of factors { including of course the signi cant quality leap from analog audio systems, the successful targeting of two distinct strata of music lovers, and nally the issues surrounding pre-introduction strategies analyzed in our model. Settling on a standard obviously helped create expectations on the part of consumers, but also on the part of hard-and software producers having to invest signi cantly in any new audio technology while taking the risk of cannibalizing their existing technology (McGahan, 1993) . In our scenarios with complete and incomplete information, the stronger rm consistently prelaunches the technology, and the weaker rm concedes if it is not too strong and/or there are signi cant bene ts from joining the prelaunched standard.
Applying these results to our motivating case suggests that Sony/Philips' design was the more e cient technology and that Matsushita gave up because they would not have been able to catch up in the remaining time leading up to the DAD conference.
While it is impossible to analyze counterfactual cases where Matsushita prelaunched rst or continued developing their own technology, anecdotal evidence suggests that Matsushita's design had less potential than Sony/Philips' both in terms of technological parameters and the potential linkup with software manufacturers. However, it appears that a fully developed version might have been viable in the marketplace given that it was approved at the DAD conference as well. It is also interesting to try and infer the amount of information and the degree of strategic symmetry from the players' prelaunch behaviour. Given Sony/Philips' prelaunch took place a relatively long time before the DAD conference, it seems that preemption played some role since a signi cant amount of technological progress was sacri ced in order to establish a standard prior to the conference. Consequently, it seems that strategic symmetry was the more likely scenario. Further, Sony/Philips were active trying to bring other licensees on board and thus make joining their standard more attractive for Matsushita, which would have been unlikely if Sony/Philips had been certain (or su ciently con dent) that Matsushita would have supported their standard anyway. Assuming network e ects play a role already in the licensing stage (a technology with more parties signed up is more likely to succeed, which in turn makes it more attractive to join { thus strengthening the bargaining position of the standard sponsors), this sequence of action seems to be ine cient from Sony/Philips' perspective since the bargaining power vis-a-vis potential licensees was lower than with Matsushita on board. If, on the other hand, the support of other industry players was deemed crucial to get Matsushita's support, sacri cing bargaining power in exchange for the higher likelihood of getting Matsushita to join seems plausible. Consequently, it appears that there was a degree of uncertainty about the state of Matsushita's technology and therefore their likely action.
Applicability of the model
Our model aims to capture some of the crucial features in the introduction of a new technology. A technology develops over time, and although an earlier version of the technology might be functional, improvements are still possible. Further, prelaunching a technology captures a wide variety of actions where a technology's sponsor commits to a certain product speci cation { for example, exhibiting a prototype at a fair, publishing a set of speci cations (as in the case of the Compact Disc), or preannouncing technical features could all be captured with the prelaunch strategy in our model. Likewise, concession by rival technologies could imply the public endorsement of the prelaunched technology, negotiations to ensure compatibility or even redirecting research e orts to conform to the industry standard.
Apart from capturing the main tradeo s in such a situation, we also assess the e ects of strategic asymmetry and incomplete information by analyzing three cases: Complete information and either strategic asymmetry (Stackelberg leadership) or symmetry, and the scenario with incomplete information. Clearly, rms will frequently attempt to maintain secrecy over their research e orts, so that a priori we expect the incomplete information case to be the most likely scenario. On the other hand, if there are signi cant knowledge spillovers regarding a technology or if players "know each other well" { for example because they have been competing in related industries previously, the complete information case may be more appropriate. This distinction is important in terms of the results they generate { complete information typically yields more e cient results: On the one hand, there will be no unsuccessful prelaunch, and on the other hand, prelaunch times (if there is a perlaunch at all) are typically closer to the e cient time. In other words, the incentive to preempt is more important with incomplete information.
Firm implications
If standardization confers bene ts, but the gains are asymmetrically distributed, rms face a "co-opetitive" situation. On one hand, rms have an interest in securing cooperation with their rivals in order to increase the size of post-commercialization pro ts. On the other hand, each rm wants their own standard chosen as the industry standard. The fact that the binding constraint for a rm to initiate a prelaunch is the rival's concession condition indicates that a rm would only be willing to "push through" their standard if this is (likely to be) successful, which is con rmed in our analysis. How can a rm in uence the likelihood of their prelaunch being successful? In our model, we assume that , the winner's share, is exogenously given, but it is conceivable that the sponsor of a standard can choose this, for example by implementing a liberal licensing policy. In fact, from Figure 1 we can see that it is always possible for a Stackelberg leader to choose a share and an appropriate prelaunch time t i to ensure that the follower always joins the standard.
An interesting set of results revolves around the incentives for strategic asymmetry. In particular, in situations where the di erence between the winner's and the loser's share is not too big (e.g. for liberally licensed technologies), it may be bene cial for players to settle on an order of moves so that the pro t-maximizing prelaunch time t i will be chosen rather than the ine cient earlier time which erodes away some of the pro ts to be gained from standardization. Agreeing on a Stackelberg leader resembles a Chicken game in some ways. It is better to be the leader than the follower, but being the follower is better than trying to preempt each other. We would therefore expect Stackelberg leadership to emerge endogenously only in a very limited set of circumstances. 29 
Conclusion
Our model generates some interesting results on the incentives to prelaunch a developing technology. However, a number of limitations and possible extensions should be noted. Most of our extensions will refer to player's strategies and payo s in the development stage. This notwithstanding, we are aware that our modeling of the bargaining stage is relatively restrictive. In ongoing work, we therefore intend to analyze an alternative modeling strategy for bargaining outlined in footnote 15. Our main goal however is to ensure the robustness of our results regarding our modeling strategy in the development 29 In particular, in our model, pre-agreement on a Stackelberg leader would not be a stable agreement for any > stage. The following paragraphs outline some of the limitations and the corresponding extensions in the development stage:
1. We currently use speci c functional forms that allow us to derive explicit solutions for launch times and the threshold values for the required (winner's and loser's) share. We expect most of our results to remain intact with alternative speci cations or more general functional forms, but exploring this possibility is the subject of future research. In particular, we expect that a more general speci cation of (t), the prelaunch bene ts, will generate prelaunch times other than just prior to the deadline. The assumption that even at t = T , there are still some bene ts to conceding (and the gradient by which concession bene ts decrease in t) drives these results.
2. Technological progress is deterministic (if not necessarily common knowledge) in our model. This simpli es our analysis at the expense of not accounting for one observation in our motivating example { Matsushita did not concede immediately after Sony/Philips had prelaunched their technology. With deterministic technological progress the follower knows immediately after the prelaunch if concession is pro table or not and consequently concedes immediately or stays in until the end. If progress were random, it would be possible for the follower to continue developing its technology for some time until it becomes clear that submitting one's own standard to the DAD conference would not be pro table. This is likely to have been a more realistic scenario regarding Matsushita's behaviour. With the simple speci cation we use, this is ignored, and incorporating stochastic technological progress is another area of future research.
3. Finally, we also currently assume that in the incomplete information case, players privately precommit to a prelaunch time. This is equivalent to assuming that there is no Bayesian updating with incomplete information. Allowing for agents to constantly update their beliefs about their rival's type would generate some interesting dynamics in terms of players becoming more bullish about their type compared to their rival's. Since stronger players will prelaunch at an earlier time, as time passes the absence of a prelaunch indicates weakness on the part of the players, which in turn feeds back on the incentives of initiating a prelaunch.
These limitations notwithstanding, we feel that our simple and stylized model of prelaunch standardization manages to capture some of the mechanisms at play in such a situation. We believe that the proposed extensions will be fruitful in terms of aligning the model closer to reality, but we are con dent that basic intuition of our initial results will remain intact. 
Proof of Proposition 3
[TO BE COMPLETED.]
Proof of Proposition 4
From proposition 1 we know that the CC is the binding constraint as opposed to PC. We concentrate on the relevant concession conditions and derive and compare them below. Players ahve di erent types, i.e. d i 6 = d j , and no roles are pre-assigned. We assume that d j < d i and start by deriving the weaker player's (j) concession condition CC j given that player i has undertaken a prelaunch at time t i and player j has not undertaken a prelaunch up to or at t i . We require that j (C) j (S), or ) (1 )q i;t i t i j (S) = With zero probability for case (c), we concentrate on cases (a) and (b) in the following argumentation. Case (a) is trivial since immediate concession strictly dominates staying in. The (relative) superiority of i 's technological development speed is so strong that player j cannot catch up until T with player i 's technology (as revealed and xed at t i ). For case (b) we derive the concession condition CC j from (1 )q i;t i t i q j;T , (1 )
and
We have t i min = min(V j ) as the rst time at which the respective CC j holds when V j [0; T ] is the set of all times during the interval at which CC j holds. So if the (relative) advantage in player i 's technological development speed is small enough as to allow player j to overtake until T provided he stays in, the choice between conceding and staying in depends on the net result from two tradeo s: (S) earns j a larger share of the prize. (C) earns j a smaller share and implies some foregone increase in technological quality (since the relevant technology for determining the size of the prize in this case is player i 's technology at t i , not player j ' s technology at T, and q j;T > q i;t i ). However, (C) increases the prize by the concession bene ts, t i . Now we turn to the stronger player's (i ) CC i (q i;T > q j;t j 8t 2 [0; T ]). Given player j prelaunches at time t j and player i has not undertaken a prelaunch up to or at t j , then we derive CC i from i (C) i (S) as
(1 )q j;t j t j q i;T , (1 )
; and
Note that cases (a) and (c) as above are not possible for d i > d j and player i undertaking a prelaunch.
By comparing CC j and CC i we obtain the following results: Case (a): If for a given time t 2 [0; T ] CC j holds, this implies that q j;T < q i;t i ) CC i cannot possibly hold.
Case (b): For given (t); M , respectively,and d i > d j , the earliest time for which CC i holds (t j min ), and hence the rst time at which the (weaker) player j would undertake a prelaunch, is greater than the earliest time for which CC j holds (t i min ). Since we have:
from which we obtain (because d i > d j )
